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The Implications of Closing Civic Space for Sustainable Development in Pakistan 
Shandana Khan Mohmand  
 
Summary 
This paper presents findings from a case study exploring the prospects for measuring the 
impacts of restricted civic space on development in Pakistan. It is part of a larger inquiry into 
the phenomenon of restrictions on civil society activity around the world, including in, but not 
restricted to, developing countries, most notably in the past decade. Pakistan’s divided and 
fragile civil society has had a troubled and uneven relationship with political and military 
power. Efforts to restrict NGOs and aid-funded organisations promoting women’s or human 
rights have a long if intermittent history, and civic actors have struggled to engage in a 
military-dominated political settlement in which regular multiparty elections are a recent 
phenomenon. Yet civil society has played an important role in democratic struggles and 
across a range of development activities. Pakistan experienced several major natural 
disasters in the past decade, and humanitarian aid has been essential to ensuring basic (if 
inadequate) protections. NGOs provide a wide range of health, education and welfare 
services to millions of people in poverty in remote and hard-to-reach parts of the country 
who would otherwise go unserved. Yet, in the name of security and national sovereignty, 
and apparently influenced closely by the global normative tide turning against democracy 
and human rights as China becomes a more significant development partner, restrictions on 
civil society have abounded, particularly since 2013. These have included arbitrary orders, 
new laws, denunciations of civic actors, and an atmosphere of fear for human rights 
defenders and the liberal democratic sections of civil society.  
 
This case study summarises findings from analysis of a specific recent episode, that of 
proposed cancellations of 30-odd NGOs, mostly international organisations (INGOs), in 
2017. The case study explores the motivations and means of the restrictions, and the 
potential impacts in terms of beneficiary populations unserved, services not delivered, and 
wider effects on disaster management, women’s rights, poverty and health and education 
services. It concludes that without significant efforts by INGOs to adapt to the new 
restrictions, and very likely even then, adverse impacts would be felt by millions of 
Pakistanis, chiefly from among the poorest and most marginalised sections of society, and in 
remote and conflict-affected settings where poverty and vulnerability are most acute. Given 
Pakistan’s poor record on inclusive or pro-poor development, and its failure to achieve the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), these closures of NGO operating space are highly 
likely to impact adversely on its achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 
to which its politicians have so publicly committed. The paper includes discussion of the 
methodological limitations of the case study approach and proposes alternative measures or 
means of assessment of the impacts of closing civic space on development in Pakistan. 
 
Keywords: closing civic space; NGOs; Pakistan; fragility; civil society; aid; sustainable 
development. 
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1  Introduction: the implications of closing 
civic space for development in Pakistan 
This paper presents findings from a case study designed to explore the prospects for 
measuring the impacts of restricted civic space on development in Pakistan. It is part of a 
larger inquiry into the phenomenon of restrictions on civil society activity around the world, 
including but not only in developing countries, most notably in the past decade. Civil society 
refers here to all forms of voluntary organisation that mediate between the state, market, and 
societal actors and interests, not only aid-funded non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
and civil society organisations (CSOs) involved in service delivery or acting as a ‘watchdog’ 
on government, but also the media, human rights defenders, professional associations, 
academia and thinktanks, social movements, workers’ organisations, and environmental 
activists. Civic space has changed rather than shrunk, overall, as new actors and spaces for 
civic engagement (notably digital) have flourished in the past decade (Hossain et al. 2018). 
Yet space has clearly closed for groups with liberal democratic and human rights agendas 
and/or receiving international aid financing. Land and indigenous rights defenders and their 
supporters and movements have faced deadly opposition in several settings. Advocates of 
freedom of speech and association, minority rights or empowerment of marginalised groups, 
or environmental protection, also face new more restrictive laws and regulations, arrests and 
detention, and informal pressures to align, a ‘chilling’ atmosphere that restrains public 
debate, stigmatisation and impunity for attacks on civil society.  
 
The present case study focused on the implications of closing civic space for development in 
Pakistan. Pakistan’s divided and fragile civil society has had a troubled and uneven 
relationship with political and military power. Efforts to restrict NGOs and aid-funded 
organisations promoting women’s or human rights have a long history, as civic actors have 
struggled to engage with power in a military-dominated political settlement with a short 
history of multiparty elections. Nevertheless, civil society has played important roles in 
democratic struggles and development activities more generally. Pakistan experienced 
several major natural disasters in the past decades, and humanitarian aid has been 
essential to ensuring basic protections of the population. NGOs provide a wide range of 
health and education and other services to millions of people in poverty in remote and hard-
to-reach parts of the country who would otherwise go unserved. Yet in the name of security 
and national sovereignty, restrictions on civil society have abounded, taking the form of 
arbitrary orders, denouncing civic actors, and establishing an atmosphere of fear for human 
rights defenders and others from the liberal democratic side of civil society.  
 
What are these restrictions likely to mean for Pakistan’s development, and specifically, its 
achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)? Pakistan failed to achieve 
most of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and public service delivery capacity 
remains weak, apparently a low priority for contending elites. The crisis of public provision 
has continued to worsen and drawn attention to the need for multiple actors to play a role in 
poverty reduction and development, even as civic space has shrunk in recent years. Civil 
society had worked closely with the military dictatorship in dealing with the aftermath of the 
2005 earthquake, and the transition to democracy in 2008 had strengthened a generally 
conducive working environment. The 2013 elections saw the return of the conservative 
Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), with its customary hostility towards Western-
supported organisations and agendas. After the elections in 2018, the new Government of 
Pakistan has an opportunity to forge a new fit between civil society and the state, in order to 
harness its capacities to forge a pro-poor or inclusive development pathway.  
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1.1 About this paper 
This paper is organised as follows. In this first section, a summary of key findings about the 
measurability of development outcomes in Pakistan is provided. The conceptual basis of the 
study is briefly outlined next, and the propositions it sought to test, and this is followed by a 
description of the methodology used. Section 2 sets out the main understandings of the 
political economy of inclusive development in relation to the specific development challenges 
facing Pakistan, situating these within a typology of political settlements. Section 3 describes 
the role of civil society in development in Pakistan, and discusses the changing nature of the 
‘fit’ between civic actors and those in the state or political society. Section 4 sets out key 
dimensions of the challenge of inclusive development in Pakistan. Section 5 traces the 
origins and outcomes of regulations on NGO activities in specific policy domains, and 
assesses estimates of their numerical, spatial and other impacts on beneficiary populations 
or service delivery capacity. Section 6 concludes with discussion of the measurable impacts 
and lessons in Pakistan, and the wider implications for the analysis of the impacts of civic 
space on development.  
 
1.2 Key findings of the Pakistan case study 
The case study was a rapid exercise to test an approach to measuring the relationship 
between closures of civic space and ‘frontline’ development outcomes, by tracing the 
implications of restrictions on NGO activities in relation to disempowered, marginalised, poor 
and vulnerable populations. The paper concludes that there are good reasons to suppose 
that recent restrictions on NGO activities have played or have the potential to play a clear 
and adverse role in Pakistan’s progress towards achieving the SDGs. For instance, 
calculations by civil society fora suggest that CSOs provide over a million children with 
access to quality education; about 23 million individuals with access to maternal and 
reproductive health care services; and that about $124 million in committed funding for 2018 
would be lost if just 11 international NGOs are shut down. 
 
The case study offers robust insights into the magnitude and nature of selected likely 
development impacts, but concludes these comprise an incomplete and fragmented view of 
the whole. Services may also be lost in policy domains not surveyed here, and while NGOs 
adapt to the restrictions and ‘chilling’ climate, the human and organisational costs of such 
adaptation are generally ignored. The restraining role of civil society and free media on 
macroeconomic management and corruption, key mechanisms of political and economic 
crises in developing countries, are further factors likely to add to the developmental costs of 
closing civic space, even if not immediately apparent. The measurability of such civic 
restraint on development is somewhat beyond the scope of the present paper, but will be 
briefly discussed in the conclusions to the accompanying methodological paper (Hossain 
and Santos 2018).  
 
However, data systems are too weak even to support aggregate analysis of the impacts on 
NGO beneficiary populations even within the selected policy domains or sectors. Within civil 
society itself there is limited transparency and coordination, and collective efforts to engage 
with new restrictions have been weak. Other impacts included qualitative changes in 
programme approaches, towards more welfarist service delivery models with less chance of 
transformative change, and greater chance of dependence. Hard-to-reach areas, including 
regions undergoing conflict, were among those likely to suffer the most, and about which 
verifiable empirical data was most scarce. The conclusions of the case study are that the 
‘frontline’ development implications of restrictions on civil society can be measured in part, 
but the current evidence base is thin, patchy, and unintegrated.  
 
The case study also offers insights into the wider international political economy within which 
civic space has closed, including the relative shift in the normative environment with the 
growing importance of Chinese development investment. Questions of sovereignty and 
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national values have been used to justify NGO regulations, and civil society has struggled to 
counter charges of allegiance to foreign values or finance. Global power shifts are shaping 
the closure of civic space, but translate differently in different national contexts. 
 
1.3 Inclusive development and the civic space: key concepts and questions 
The design of this case study drew on a conceptual framework which recognised that 
restrictions on civic space were part of wider national political struggles, and an effort by 
political elites to gain or consolidate resources or political power. How this shapes inclusive 
development outcomes depends on the elite commitment and state capacity to deliver 
broadly inclusive outcomes, in turn shaped by the balance of political power, or political 
settlement, and how that shapes development policy (Hossain et al. 2018 based on authors 
cited in the text). ‘Inclusive development’ is used here in a broad sense, to signal pro-poor 
and equalising patterns of economic growth alongside robust and inclusive progress on 
human development indicators. Among other aims, this paper aims to establish the extent to 
which inclusive outcomes have been measurably associated with freer civic space in 
Pakistan.  
 
Elite commitment and state capacity to inclusive development will likely differ in nature and 
form in pluralist political settlements in which civic actors have a voice and a claim compared 
to more dominant systems, in which civil society is neutralised or silenced. A key question is 
whether inclusive development outcomes can be delivered in settings where political power 
has closed the space for public debate or participation, or if they depend on civil society 
actors, marginalised groups and the media participating in and scrutinising public policy 
debates and institutions. The evidence suggests a range of civil society roles in inclusive 
development processes, including in the historical process of building institutions and 
establishing values that underpin economic growth, and in the development of partnerships 
and alliances for aid and development financing; holding governments and market actors to 
account; empowering and combating the exclusion of marginalised groups, including 
through mobilisation and service delivery; in protective functions in relation to humanitarian 
assistance and human rights; and in information and communication, generating evidence 
and debate about development processes.  
 
A safe conclusion seems to be that inclusive processes play some functions necessary to 
sustaining development over the medium- to long-term, by enabling the management of 
difference and the inclusion of the most vulnerable. However, inclusive processes are 
generally insufficient conditions for inclusive outcomes, if they coexist with – or exacerbate – 
a lack of elite commitment or state capacity to deliver. Much depends on histories of civil 
society and state-society relations, and on the ‘fit’ between civil society and the state. This 
means that it is not only free space to operate that matters, but the extent to which civil 
society can usefully engage with or exert influence on the state when it needs to. This ‘fit’ will 
change over time and circumstance, with civic actors at times in opposition to, and at others 
aligned with, state power. Freedom in civic space is important, but capacity to engage is 
equally so. The case study was designed to analyse this fit, through an analysis of key 
moments of contention around civic space between civil society and the state.  
 
1.4 Case study methodology 
The case study tested a methodological approach to direct measurement of the impacts of 
restricted civic space, tracing restrictions on civic space through to impacts on beneficiary 
populations. The methodology specified episodes when civic space had been in contention 
in policy domains where ‘frontline’ inclusive development outcomes (poverty and hunger 
reduction, gender equality, etc.) were at stake. It documented and analysed how NGOs and 
CSOs responded to new restrictions in 2017, the organisations or programmes that faced 
closure or adaptation, and assessed the overall impacts on specific policy domains or SDGs, 
with numerical estimates of impacts on beneficiaries or services. It then drew methodological 
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conclusions about the prospects for measuring development impact in Pakistan, and more 
widely.  
 
The conceptual framework for the study (Hossain et al 2018) makes several propositions 
about the mechanisms through which that impact is likely to play out in immature competitive 
political systems such as the fledgling democracy of Pakistan. We would expect:  
 
 restrictions on civic space to limit the representativeness and inclusiveness of 
democratic dialogue, so that groups with less power in the political settlement – often 
women, workers, small farmers, displaced persons, or minority groups – would lose 
‘civil’ channels for voice and take to protest to be heard 
 that where civic space is an established feature of most mature democracies, 
restrictions that cut services are unlikely, and direct adverse development impacts 
unlikely to be significant or large-scale. But in Pakistan, a long history of military rule 
has meant uneven and distant relations between state and civil society, influenced 
more by transnational and security factors than by domestic development imperatives 
 freedom of speech and association are likely to be seen as direct threats to state 
power, particularly since the advent of cyberspace 
 a critique of ‘foreign’ norms may justify efforts to curb civil society power on grounds of 
sovereignty 
 periods of economic volatility are likely to result in wage, resource, and commodity 
price struggles. 
 
The case study attempted to assess whether and how these – and other – mechanisms 
operated in the Pakistan case, in order to provide a comprehensive analysis of the relation 
between civic space and inclusive development outcomes.  
 
The conceptual framework for this study indicated in-depth analysis of specific episodes of 
contention around civic space in which ‘frontline’ development outcomes are clearly 
implicated. In Pakistan, this work focused on restrictions placed on NGOs, and in particular 
on the currently evolving case of a group of international NGOs threatened with expulsion in 
late 2017. The focus was on observable processes through which restrictions on civic space 
was likely to lead to losses of or changes in service provision for particular groups and in 
selected sectors. The study involved extensive reviews of published and grey documents, 
and face-to-face interviews with 15 selected key informants in Islamabad and Lahore 
between January and April 2018. The informants comprised representatives of different 
types of civil society organisations, national and international, service-delivering NGOs and 
other types of civic actors. The interviews were semi-structured and aimed to collect the 
unique perspectives of people working in different types of civil society organisations on the 
set of issues and challenges that they now face in Pakistan, as well as their views on why 
civic space has shrunk over the last few years. They were also asked about the impact of 
this shrinkage on equitable and inclusive development in general, and on particular 
population groups and on Pakistan’s performance on SDGs.  
 
Time and resources were key constraints. Within its limited scope, the case study optimised 
the resources by focusing on the evolving situation of shrinking space for NGOs in light of 
announcements of new regulations and potential expulsions in 2017. Interviews also 
discussed increasing curbs on media and academia, but these issues were not explored in 
the same detail. The study also faced limitations in the form of respondents’ fear of reprisals 
under the current security environment. Some respondents were unwilling to be a part of the 
study, while some others took long to respond to interview requests. Those that spoke to us 
did so under conditions of confidentiality, and so no names or identifiable interview details 
are provided.  
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2  The political economy of inclusive 
development in Pakistan 
2.1 The challenge of inclusive development in Pakistan 
Conflict, disasters, weak governance, and democratic transition meant Pakistan’s progress 
on human development indicators early in the new millennium slowed or even reversed in 
the decade to 2015. Having failed on most of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
(Ministry of Planning, Development, and Reform 2013), Pakistan now faces an uphill 
challenge to meet the SDGs (Rehman 2018).  
 
Pakistan’s uneven development progress has been underpinned by erratic growth. As is the 
case with its comparators, Pakistan’s economic growth dipped at points in the past decade 
(see Figure 2.1). Yet, as Figure 2.1 suggests, Pakistan was hit harder by global economic 
shocks and natural disasters, and/or took longer to recover than other South Asian or Lower 
Middle Income countries. The proportion of the population living in poverty has declined, 
according to official statistics (see Table 2.1). Yet deeper and more multidimensional 
analysis indicates that these statistics may overstate progress, and mask high rates of 
‘churning’ into and out of poverty, indicating many Pakistanis are exposed to the downsides 
of economic volatility (Amina Khan et al. 2015). The prevalence of undernourishment, a key 
poverty and wellbeing indicator, has been substantially higher in Pakistan than in 
comparator countries and aggregates (see Figure 2.2).   
 
Figure 2.1 GDP and GDP per capita growth, 1998–2017 
 
 
Source: World Development Indicators (accessed 13 August 2018). 
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Table 2.1 The proportion of the population living in poverty, 1998–2013 
  1998 1999 2001 2002 2004 2005 2007 2008 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Population 
living on 
less than 
$1.90 
(2011 
PPP) a 
day (%) 
Pakistan 
 
23.4  28.6  18 16.5 13.2  8.3 7.9  6.1 
Lower 
middle 
income 
 37.5 35   30.2  26.5 22.6 19.6 17.9  
Population 
living 
below 
national 
poverty 
line (%) 
Pakistan 57.9  64.5  51 50.4 44.1  36.8 36.3  29.5 
Source: World Development Indicators (accessed 13 August 2018). 
 
Figure 2.2 Prevalence of undernourishment, Pakistan and comparators 
 
Source: World Development Indicators (accessed 15 August 2018). 
 
The SDGs formally enjoy high-level cross-party political support. However, as the record of 
the MDGs has shown, public service delivery is generally weak, and institutional 
coordination within the government limited (Ministry of Planning, Development, and Reform 
2013). Public spending on core education and health services is low (Illangovan and 
Francisco 2017). Tackling problems of child undernutrition requires coordination between 
health, education, food security, and water and sanitation agencies, as well as an ability to 
engage women. Gender inequalities can be seen as a structuring dimension of development 
progress in Pakistan. Ranked 130 out of 159 countries in 2015, women in Pakistan continue 
to face significant challenges in the realms of labour force and political participation, access 
to finance, as well as on key education and health services. Tackling development 
challenges such as maternal and infant mortality, undernutrition, and poverty is known to 
depend on women’s participation, yet progress overall on women’s rights and gender 
equality has been highly uneven.  
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2.2 Development and the political settlement in Pakistan 
In terms of the typology developed as part of the conceptual framework for this study, 
Pakistan represents a formally democratic and competitive yet predatory state, where 
various elites have shared power between them since independence. ‘Predatory’ refers to 
the fact that Pakistan’s development cannot be characterised as pro-poor, and that its 
benefits have been frequently captured by ruling elites and their allies rather than those in 
greatest need (see Easterly 2001 for an earlier analysis). Alliances between military, 
bureaucratic, and traditional landed elites have proven resilient, enabling a concentration of 
military, economic, and organisational power that has sustained across intermittent 
democratic regimes (Alavi 1972; Jalal 1995, 1999; Akhtar 2018). This has enabled a 
‘dominance by an elite who does not support human capital investment in the masses’ 
(Easterly 2001: 3).  
 
The official view of social protection underwent a ‘paradigm shift’ following the turmoil of the 
2007 economic and political crisis that brought an end to direct military rule (Gazdar 2011). 
Civil society played a role in democracy and anti-corruption struggles, as well as raising 
awareness of the effects of the economic crisis on the population living with poverty or 
vulnerability. However, the period of multiparty rule since 2008 has done little to shift the 
assessment of the developmental qualities of the Pakistani elite. While it is widely 
recognised that civil society has an important potential role in progress towards the SDGs, 
NGOs and CSOs complain of a lack of information and engagement regarding the SDGs 
with local and national government, indicating a weak fit in relation to ongoing SDG policies 
and programmes at multiple levels (Rehman 2018).  
 
2.2.1 Civil society and the securitisation of the state 
Recent efforts to shrink NGO operating space across the country largely reflect the political 
economy of development in Pakistan, in which the securitisation of the Pakistan state has 
taken priority, and for which the normative environment internationally is changing, creating 
more space for right-wing politics and authoritarian rule.  
 
The security situation in Pakistan deteriorated significantly across all provinces from 2008 
onwards. Terrorist attacks by the Pakistani Taliban and Al-Qaeda-supported groups and 
sectarian violence between rival sects and against religious minorities affected major cities 
and smaller towns, making it difficult for CSOs to operate safely. The increased incidence of 
violence led to counter operations by Pakistan’s security forces and an increasingly security-
focused mind-set of state agencies. International and local organisations have found it 
increasingly difficult to carry on normal activities within this context. Smaller local 
organisations dealing with sensitive issues of minority and women’s rights have been 
particularly affected in their work within communities. NGO workers, especially those 
administering polio vaccines, have been targeted and killed on multiple occasions, largely 
because of distrust of them as foreign agents. Funding has shrunk as a result of security 
threats as donors have pulled back from projects that are increasingly difficult to monitor. 
 
Securitisation has mixed with growing nationalism, supported by assertions about external 
attacks on national sovereignty. A sense of insecurity was intensified by the killing of Osama 
bin Laden by the US, and a string of terrorist attacks on state installations, as well as the 
2014 attack on the Army Public School (APS) in Peshawar that killed 140 children. This 
atmosphere of insecurity enables security agencies to justify growing scrutiny and regulation 
of international actors. A change in attitude towards INGOs around 2015 was apparently part 
of a broader National Action Plan (NAP) designed to intensify efforts against terrorism in the 
aftermath of the APS attack.  
 
Many respondents recognised the magnitude of the genuine security risk faced by the 
Pakistani state, and saw regulating fund flows and the largely unregulated INGO sector as 
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legitimate requirements. The country spent 2017 under the threat of blacklisting by the 
global Financial Action Task Force (FATF), and was eventually placed on a ‘grey list’ in June 
2018 because of international concerns about terror financing, with adverse implications for 
its financial standing and ability to attract foreign investment. To come off the watchlist, the 
country must be seen to take serious action against money laundering and terror financing. 
One respondent from an INGO explained,  
 
There is no proven case till today of an international organisation laundering money for 
a terrorist outfit, but it is something that the government has to be really cautious about 
especially because civil society organisations are responsible for cross-border 
movement of huge sums of money. And unless there are strict rules and regulations, 
there is a strong chance in today’s world that such money can come from or end up in 
wrong hands. Pakistan is under immense pressure from FATF to make its banking and 
foreign transactions fool-proof.  
 
Greater transparency by national and international NGOs has not eased up restrictions on 
their work. Several respondents who work for national organisations noted that the recent 
moves against NGOs fall within a generally shrinking space for civil society organisations 
that also affects national NGOs, indigenous movements, academic institutions, and 
research. One respondent said,  
 
I think it would not be right to say that the state or the government has at once started 
opposing NGOs. It gives an impression as if Pakistani government or state institutions 
were previously all for NGOs and had a very welcoming attitude. We all know that is 
not true. 
 
Nevertheless, restrictions against different types of civil society organisations have certainly 
intensified over recent months, and have also affected the work of journalists, bloggers, 
human rights defenders, and academia. A ban on student unions and politics has been in 
place since 1984 (with a short respite between 1988 and 1993). Regulation of academic 
activities intensified in 2018, signalling a ‘closure of intellectual space within the country’ 
(The Academia 2018). Research activities are under greater scrutiny; GPS and mapping 
activities are prohibited, while research and surveys require No Objection Certificates 
(NOCs) from a recently constituted body, the District Investigation Committee (DIC), which 
comprises the district administration and security agencies and reviews applications every 
3–4 months. Many requests are rejected or receive no response, leading to long delays in 
research project implementation. 
 
The securitisation of the state also means an increasingly hostile environment for journalists, 
human rights defenders, and other activists. The United Nations Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) raised serious concerns over ‘repeated reports of 
abduction, killings and intimidation of human rights defenders, particularly those fighting for 
economic, social and cultural rights, allegedly committed in some cases by State agents’ in 
its July 2017 review of Pakistan (CIVICUS 2018). In one recent example, activists from the 
Pakistan Fisherfolk Forum (PFF) were abducted in Sindh province by armed persons 
allegedly linked to a provincial minister in December 2017. The activists had played a 
significant role in mobilising the local fishing community to claim their rights and were 
abducted while surveying various lakes in the Sujawal district to assess the extent of the 
illegal occupation of the lakes (CIVICUS 2018). In January 2017, five bloggers who were 
critical of the military and security agencies were ‘disappeared.’ Others have been 
kidnapped over the year, and while some were eventually released, Pakistan’s list of 
unresolved ‘missing persons’ cases currently stands at 313 (HRCP 2018; Amnesty 
International 2017; Freedom House 2017b). Three members of the Human Rights 
Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) have also disappeared between 2016 and 2017 (Sayeed 
2017). Participation in peaceful assemblies and protests continues to pose risks to activists 
and journalists due to the use of excessive force to disperse protests, the criminalisation of 
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protests under the guise of anti-terrorism legislation, as well as the risk of interference and 
attack by terrorist groups (CIVICUS 2016, 2017). 
 
Media groups – curbs on which have been the subject of much domestic and international 
attention through 2018 – have not so far backed other civil society groups in helping expand 
this space, and are not considered strong or reliable partners. A respondent who works with 
a coalition of civil society organisations reflected back on its history to say that civil society 
had become an easy target because its various arms do not work in solidarity around a 
common cause: 
 
The media, labour organisations and NGOs are all divided. Civil society used to 
include a lot of activism, but this has been killed by the current structure of aid, and by 
donors’ reporting mechanisms. Our civil society organisations are now all focussed on 
budgets and regulations, big decisions are now made by finance officers. There is no 
collective action now for structural change. 
 
2.2.2 The global ‘playbook’ and the rise of right-wing politics 
National drivers to control civic space have been strengthened by a shift in the normative 
environment away from democratic values, and towards decreasing tolerance of dissent and 
suppression of the rights of religious, racial or ethnic minorities, including in countries like 
Turkey, the Philippines, Australia, the USA, and others. The suggestion here is that actors 
such as Pakistan’s security forces may have stepped up opposition to civil society actors 
secure in the belief that there will be fewer external sanctions to face. Respondents spoke of 
the ‘China playbook’, referencing China’s growing influence in Pakistan as part of the China-
Pakistan Economic Corridor (or CPEC, a part of the Belt and Road Initiative), Pakistan’s 
growing ability to ignore other global actors, and China’s own highly-controlled civic space. 
In April 2016, the Chinese government gave the police increased powers to supervise the 
work of NGOs operating in the country and required them to declare their sources of funding 
(Perlman 2017). Later, a law to govern INGOs went into effect in China in 2017 that ‘grants 
broad powers to police to question NGO workers, monitor their finances, regulate their work 
and shut down offices’ (Reuters 2016). The law speaks of harm to Chinese national 
interests, is vague in what constitutes such activities, includes a complex registration 
process for INGOs, has implications for restricting the work of different types of civil society 
groups, including academia, and is closely connected to its counterterrorism efforts. These 
are all features that the reader will recognise below in our case study of the increased 
regulation of international NGOs operating in Pakistan.  
 
Another part of the global playbook, apparently Turkish in this case, is the idea that the state 
can meet SDG targets through the creation of public companies for service delivery, and 
does not require civil society support. Over the last couple of years, 56 such public 
companies have been created in the province of Punjab alone. The companies are currently 
being investigated for corruption, excessive expenditures, and for incurring losses, and their 
future is at present uncertain, but some of our respondents pointed out that they represent 
the Punjab government’s new approach towards service delivery. ‘They no longer need us to 
help them like they used to, when we were regularly included on the government’s planning 
fora’ said one respondent from a national organisation. This is not to suggest that services 
should not be provided through alternatives structures, but that NGOs have seen a 
deterioration of their working relationship with government as a result, especially in 
Pakistan’s demographically dominant province, Punjab.  
 
National and global drivers of the balance of power in Pakistan have combined to increase 
restrictions on civic space. What those political influences on civic space mean for 
development depends on the nature of civil society and its relations with the state and the 
development process, discussed next. 
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3  The role of civil society  
3.1 The evolution of civil society–state relations 
Civil society in Pakistan is made up of NGOs, community-based organisations, thinktanks, 
trades unions, cultural groups, and informal citizen organisations. Its evolution can be 
divided into four phases since the country’s independence in 1947. During the first, roughly 
from independence to the end of the left-leaning Bhutto regime in 1977, encompassing also 
the first military regime during the 1960s, civil society was focused around local collective 
organisations such as trade and student unions, welfare and charity organisations, women’s 
groups, bar associations, peasant organisations, literary and media societies, and religious 
activity focused around madrasas and Christian missions. These were largely voluntary 
associations with strong ideological leanings and were based around struggles for 
democracy, labour rights, political representation, women’s rights and so on.  
 
The second phase lasted through the second military regime, under General Zia Ul Haq 
from 1977 to 1988, during which many of these groups were suppressed. However, the 
period led to the emergence of a pro-democracy movement that was intricately interwoven 
with an emergent women’s movement. The strengthening of these associations, together 
with a growing middle class, led to the creation of local civil society organisations that were 
focused on human rights, in particular on the rights of women, minorities, and workers. This 
period produced some of the most well-known and enduring local civil society organisations 
in Pakistan.  
 
The third phase that emerged in the early 1990s following a democratic transition came to 
be organised around NGOs and foreign funding. Greater space was now available to civil 
society, and then later in the 2000s to media groups as well, and the focus was on both 
advocacy and service delivery activities. Political mobilisation took a backseat to concerns of 
human development and poverty reduction, and NGOs functioned separately from other 
members of civil society, such as trade and student unions, labour groups, lawyers, students 
and so on. In the decade following the September 11 attacks in 2001, Pakistan became one 
of the top destinations for foreign aid, with a rapid inflow of resources into the country 
(Naviwala 2017). Development actors flourished with a large portfolio of projects in various 
sectors. However, efforts to restrict their space started early on, with the conservative PML-N 
government of 1997–99, which targeted women’s groups in particular. A regular criticism of 
NGOs at this time was their lack of accountability to constituents and dependence on 
external funds and agendas, and the fragmented nature and limited real impact of their work, 
both in terms of improving access to services and fostering collective action (Bano 2012).  
 
A distinguishable fourth phase started with Pakistan’s most recent transition to democracy in 
2008 after the end of its third military regime. A shift was visible around this time in the form 
of a large number of NGOs coming together within networks, alliances, and consortia to 
push for political and social change. The impetus for this new mode of working was provided 
by civil society’s response to a series of disasters that devastated large parts of Pakistan 
over a period of five years – the earthquake of 2005 and the massive floods of 2010 and 
2011. NGOs changed the way they operated in the aftermath of these catastrophes. 
Cooperation across different organisations increased, coordination across geographical and 
thematic areas became the norm, and networks were formed around a number of issues. 
While NGOs had stayed away from government agencies in the past, they now worked 
jointly and in coordination with state agencies. State agencies too were largely supportive of 
civil society organisations both during Musharraf’s military regime, when the 2005 
earthquake happened, and under the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) government from 2008 
to 2013, when the country was twice hit by floods. International organisations such as 
ActionAid were publicly lauded by the Pakistani government for its humanitarian and 
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development assistance, having provided critical emergency relief during the 2005 
earthquake (Toppa 2018). This was true of other international organisations as well, and that 
‘the government and state agencies welcomed all humanitarian organisations with wide 
open arms at the time, especially the international ones that brought huge budgets with 
them’, said one of our respondents from an INGO.  
 
As noted in the previous section, the present period appears to be marking a new, colder 
and more controlling relationship between state and civil society, as discussed in the 
previous section. 
 
3.2 The roles of civil society in development  
Civil society has played diverse roles in Pakistan’s development, reflecting the diversity or 
divisions within the category of voluntary or ‘non-profit organisations’ in Pakistan, and its 
contributions to development are not easily captured. The fit between civil society and the 
state has only rarely been close, and then only on specific matters, such as emergency aid, 
or women’s rights, and under very particular political economic conditions. Civil society 
operates substantially apart from the state, as a rule, with much activity focused on local 
service provision. In the early 2000s, Khan and Khan (2004) found most civil society groups 
were active in the provision of religious education, chiefly madrassah schools. A significant 
subset of civil society organisations was working in development-related areas such as 
poverty and livelihoods, women’s rights, or health and education services, mostly with 
foreign funding and transnational links. Deep divides between religious groups and secular 
human rights actors keep civil society fragmented and weak, as do efforts by the state to 
restrict or repress groups, usually those on the liberal NGOs and women’s rights side of the 
division (Sattar 2011; Khan and Khan 2004). It should be noted that both the religious right 
and the liberal democratic sides of civil society have strong transnational links, and that 
struggles over the civic space are also shaped by enduring external partnerships with 
polarising values.  
 
This fragile and polarised civil society reflects and also explains its general failure to help 
manage social difference in just and sustainable ways, and to ensure accountability to the 
marginalised and powerless. As late as 2004, the contributions of civil society, or 
specifically, its liberal and progressive sections, to pro-poor development in Pakistan were 
seen to have been modest: 
 
Civil society organisations and social movements espousing a transformative agenda 
have not registered significant success in challenging the fundamental power 
imbalances inherent to Pakistani society.  
(Nadvi and Robinson 2004: 10) 
 
If civil society appeared to have little power to convene a challenge to powerful landed and 
other economic interests to bring about a more pro-poor development, neither had it 
contributed to the core challenge of containing extremism in Pakistan (Sattar 2011). 
Nevertheless, Khan and Khan (2004) concluded that in the early Musharraf years, civil 
society organisations, ranging from service-delivery to more transformative development 
groups had played an important role in pro-poor development and social change in Pakistan, 
and that NGOs were well-linked into broader social movements around civic and political 
rights, women’s rights and environmental issues (Khan and Khan 2004). Yet it is not clear 
that civil society and social movements played any important role in the pluralistic and 
poverty-focused policy environment in which the Benazir Income Support Programme, a 
pioneering women-targeted cash transfer scheme, was established (Gazdar 2011).  
 
More measurably, Pakistan’s estimated 45,000 CSOs in Pakistan have made direct 
contributions across different sectors. CSOs have been active in the areas of poverty 
 17 
reduction, education, maternal and child healthcare, and disaster management, focused in 
particular on the needs of women and girls. Data on CSO service delivery is limited, but 
according to the Pakistan Civil Society Forum (PCSF), CSOs are providing quality education 
to well over 1 million children (half girls), and maternal and reproductive health care services 
to 23 million individuals. Programmes in the microfinance sector have more than 30 million 
users across the country (half women), and these micro-entrepreneurs have created about 
1 million jobs.1 A significant number of CSO programmes have been formally in collaboration 
with Government. Civil society groups have paid great attention to building public-non-
governmental partnerships to address the challenge of delivering basic public health and 
education services (PCP 2007, 2009, 2011). 
 
CSOs themselves have provided important formal sector employment opportunities – PCSF 
estimates suggest that 10,000 NGOs alone have more than 500,000 employees.2 Analysis 
of the scale of employment in civil society from as early as 2002 showed civil society 
employment to comprise 10 per cent of public sector employment, and 1.4 per cent of 
private formal sector employment (Ali 2006). No more recent data appear to be available.  
 
The country’s development challenges have been further exacerbated by major natural 
disasters such as droughts, earthquakes, and floods. CSOs have been at the forefront of 
efforts for delivering essential services to affected populations during national disasters, and 
for the rehabilitation of affected communities. Yet they have no voice in policymaking, and 
the weakness of Pakistan’s disaster preparedness relate also to the weakness of civil 
society advocacy and effective scrutiny of disaster management policy (Bussell and Fayaz 
2017). 
 
 
4  Episodes of closure and contention over 
civic space  
4.1 Targets of efforts to close civic space 
This section examines the case of NGOs in Pakistan, and in particular the case of 
international NGOs (INGOs), a group that has come in for very stringent scrutiny in recent 
years, as an example of the type of impact that shrinking civil society space can be expected 
to have in Pakistan. Most interviewees dated the most recent episode of contention relating 
to shrinking space for NGOs in Pakistan to five years previously, when the conservative 
right-wing party, Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), defeated the left-leaning 
Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) in the May 2013 elections. The PML-N has a history of 
hostility towards civil society, and NGOs in particular. When the party was last in power 
between 1997 and 1999 (when it was dismissed by General Musharraf’s military coup), 
Punjab province’s Minister for Social Welfare and Women Development had led an attack 
against local NGOs, and restricted their operations. NGOs were criticised for receiving 
external funds and for being anti-state, and those working on women’s rights in particular 
were targeted as immoral and anti-religion. This was despite the fact that many women’s 
rights organisations had worked closely with different governments through the 1990s in 
preparing strategy papers for international conventions and conferences. In PML-N’s last 
year in power in 1999: 
 
Some 2,000 groups in Punjab province and more than 200 in Sindh province have 
been banned by the federal and provincial governments. The widely respected Human 
Right Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) has been refused permission to print its 
                                                     
1  These figures are from data provided by PCSF in interviews. 
2  ibid.  
 18 
newsletter and Shirkat Gah, a women’s legal group, accused of embezzling 8 million 
dollars from World Bank funds, a charge the Bank has denied.  
(Rizvi 1999) 
 
The alleged impetus behind the de-registration of NGOs at the time was the Government’s 
desire to regulate the sector, and gain greater control over their activities and budgets. A 
source close to the PML-N provincial minister was quoted as follows, ‘the NGOs are 
overstepping their mandate. They are raising political issues and not following their charters’, 
while the minister publicly accused NGOs of misusing funds, and supported a media 
campaign that labelled many of the leading NGOs as ‘enemies of the nation’ (Rizvi 1999). 
Attempts at greater regulation of NGOs had also occurred under PPP governments in the 
1990s, but without the public vilification of the sector. 
 
A generally constructive working relationship between the state and NGOs existed under 
General Musharraf’s military regime, especially with international organisations that brought 
large amounts of humanitarian aid to the country after the devastating 2005 earthquake in 
northern Pakistan, and the massive floods in 2010 and 2011. The military government that 
was in power at the time of the earthquake created the National Disaster Management 
Authority (NDMA) to coordinate the sector, and despite increased scrutiny, the atmosphere 
remained generally conducive for CSOs in general, and INGOs in particular, which operated 
under open-ended agreements with the Government. A positive and supportive working 
relationship continued under the PPP government until 2013. 
 
The climate changed in 2013 when the PML-N came back to power. NGOs interviewed 
previously for another project in 20143 had reported a definite shift in their working 
environment with the change of government, and said that they now faced greater 
regulations, suspicion, and mistrust. A November 2013 policy – the Policy for Regulation of 
Organisations Receiving Foreign Contribution – sought to provide a basis for greater 
scrutiny and regulation of all foreign funding to both domestic and international NGOs. Most 
of our respondents believed that this change of climate was a reaction to the 2011 hunt for 
Osama bin Laden (and his eventual killing in a residential compound in Abbottabad). The 
CIA operation had been fronted by a vaccination campaign led by a local doctor, who was 
allegedly linked to Save the Children, though the connection is denied by the INGO. This 
incident embarrassed Pakistan and resulted in increasing mistrust of international 
organisations, though it was not until the PML-N government took over that definitive moves 
were made against international organisations and development workers in general.  
 
4.2 Strategies and approaches used to restrict civic actors 
The Government’s reaction in terms of increased restrictions, however, has been quite 
broad-based. Over the last five years, the Government has introduced a series of laws and 
regulations that impose legal restrictions on freedom of expression on issues such as the 
constitution, the armed forces, the judiciary, and religion, for reasons including national 
security and anti-terrorism (Freedom House 2017a). Loosely defined contempt laws have 
been used to prevent journalists from reporting on certain issues, while anti-terrorism laws 
have also been used to prosecute journalists (Freedom House 2017a). People have been 
prosecuted for alleged breaches of colonial-era blasphemy laws that are used to criminalise 
expression on religion (Amnesty International 2017). Security forces have been granted a 
range of powers under the Protection of Pakistan Act of 2014, allowing them to search, 
detain, and use force against suspects in violation of ‘internet offenses and other offenses 
related to information technology’ (Freedom House 2017a). Freedom on the internet is 
further threatened by the controversial Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act (PECA) of 2016, 
                                                     
3  As part of an MFS-II evaluation of support to civil society organisations in Pakistan by the Dutch government and Dutch 
development agencies.  
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which makes it legal for the government to force internet companies to remove any ‘speech, 
sound, data, writing, image, or video’ without court approval (ICNL 2017). PECA has also 
raised concerns for allowing imprisonment for ‘disseminating information with “dishonest” 
intent, or which is deemed to harm an individual’s reputation’ (Freedom House 2017a).  
 
Through 2016, the state came down particularly hard on national NGOs, requiring them to 
re-register with added documentation if they received any funds from abroad. A number of 
organisations working in southern Punjab, in districts along the Indian border, in Baluchistan, 
and in the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan – areas that are considered particularly 
sensitive – and on women’s and human rights issues (about 350 by some counts), were 
asked to stop all activities because they were ‘pursuing an anti-state agenda’. Others began 
to be visited more regularly by intelligence agencies – according to one respondent, the 
Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, one of Pakistan’s leading CSOs, receives a weekly 
visit from military intelligence, using the National Action Plan (NAP) as the reason. Letters 
received by local NGOs from various state bodies at the time suggested that activities 
considered part of an anti-state agenda included accusing the armed forces of harassment; 
presenting a bleak picture of the human rights situation in Pakistan to external actors such 
as the UN Commission on Human Rights; and receiving foreign funds without full disclosure 
of sources and activities (Saeed 2017). Our respondents suggested that a ‘foreign agenda’ 
was now synonymous with an ‘anti-national agenda’, and included issues like ‘gender 
discrimination, domestic violence, women and human rights, all of which are thought to be a 
part of foreign agenda and which have nothing to do with Pakistan or its society’.  
 
These orders were challenged in courts in 2017 by an alliance of local organisations as 
being illegal, given that they were based on no existing laws.4 Two local organisations led 
this effort – South Asia Partnership Pakistan (SAP-PK) and Taangh Wasaib – with the 
renowned lawyer and activist, Asma Jahangir, as their council. The orders for registration 
were quickly withdrawn when they were challenged in court, and after the Chief Justice of 
the Lahore High Court asked the government to legislate a full policy if it wanted to control 
NGOs rather than simply level charges of ‘non-state activities’. ‘They withdrew the order to 
make sure that it wasn’t litigated, that no precedence would be set’ that might weaken future 
action, said a respondent who is a lawyer by profession and a human rights activist. Another 
respondent suggested that the government has chosen to act through orders, often vaguely 
worded, rather than through legislation because they would not actually manage to pass this 
through Parliament. Respondents were particularly biting on this front, suggesting that,  
 
The whole chaos and confusion caused by a shady and unwritten process serves the 
state well. They can claim to act under legitimate pretext of registering foreign funded 
organisations and still keep organisations in check by not providing them clear rules of 
engagement.  
 
Nevertheless, the close regulation of NGO activities by state agencies continued. One 
respondent said that sometimes the interference was as detailed as moving their activities 
from one selected union council5 to another one that the agencies were more comfortable 
with. Another respondent said that despite the fact that their national organisation is formally 
registered under the Companies Ordinance, all their local implementing partners require 
NOCs to undertake activities, which is  
 
A constant nuisance, takes up a lot of time, and delays project implementation. This is 
a grave concern for development organisations as our interventions fail to achieve 
desired results and outcomes due to such delays. Donors take such delays to be a 
                                                     
4  Information from interviews. 
5  The lowest tier and administrative unit of local government in Pakistan. 
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result of bad planning and therefore the reputation of our national organisations is at 
stake.  
 
Some NOCs are easier to get than others, based on the specific funder and also the areas 
of operation: 
 
It is easier to get an NOC for a project in which we working with donor organisations 
such as EU and DFID, but the ones that are funded by USAID are much tougher to get 
clearance for from the establishment now. One of our projects in the Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), funded by USAID, was denied an NOC recently 
and so it had to be dropped. 
 
Another added: 
 
The Government is much more interested now in knowing where our funds are coming 
from and where they are being spent than they were just a couple of years ago. We 
have to share information such as profiles of project staff, donor information, value of 
project, communities and people that we are looking to target through our intervention, 
kind of activities that would be carried out on ground and even the communication and 
training materials that would be used in different programs are sometimes demanded 
by the agencies. 
 
The responsibility for monitoring and security clearance of INGOs, previously held by the 
Economic Affairs Division within the Finance Ministry, was shifted to the Interior Ministry 
under an October 2015 policy – the Policy for the Regulation of INGOs in Pakistan – that 
introduced financial and administrative restrictions on the work of INGOs. The policy 
required INGOs to reapply for registration through a new online form and obtain an MOU 
with the government. Once government approval is granted through NOCs, INGOs must 
register for ‘specific field(s) of work and specified location(s) or areas of operation, after 
consultation with the relevant federal and provincial authorities, and in line with the needs 
and national priorities of Pakistan’ (ICNL 2017). The Interior Ministry further requires that 
INGOs spend no more than 30 percent on administrative expenses, employ no more than 
10 percent of foreign national staff, and that Pakistani nationals be given preference for key 
positions. Every year, organisations are required to submit performance audits and third-
party evaluations of their work (Naviwala 2017). Further, INGOs are required to obtain 
security clearance from Pakistani missions abroad before foreign nationals intending to work 
for them can be issued with initial visas (Gishkori 2015).  
 
Our interviews revealed that the new process for registration was vague and unclear, offered 
little systematised information to applicants, and was administered in an arbitrary manner, 
with short term MOUs provided that only covered a few months of operations at a time. The 
process was also time consuming, requiring about 15 different documents with financial, 
operational and programmatic details to be submitted to the ministry, including detailed staff 
particulars, tax return, and funding and registration details in home countries, amongst other 
information (Ali 2018 and interviews). The language used to explain this greater scrutiny 
raised concerns that INGO issues are viewed by the government not from a development 
but a security standpoint, and as proof of ‘the repositioning of Pakistan as a security state 
and perceiving all forms of dissent as a security challenge,’ (Sayeed 2017; Toppa 2018). 
The Interior Minister was quoted in 2015 as follows:  
 
There were some intelligence reports suggesting some of the international NGOs 
funded by US, Israel and India were involved in working on an anti-Pakistan agenda. 
Let me clarify: offices of any international NGO found doing anti-Pakistan activities 
would be shut down. 
(Perlman 2017) 
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This meant in practice that ‘NGOs working against Pakistan’s strategic, security, economic, 
or other interests will have their registration cancelled’ (Toppa 2018). A few months before 
the policy was issued, Save the Children’s Islamabad office was closed down in June 2015 
by officials placing a lock on the organisation’s front gates under orders from the Interior 
Ministry. 
 
In December 2017, about 29 INGOs (some reports suggested 27 or 31) were issued with 
notices from the Ministry of Interior ordering them to shut down operations within 90 days 
(Sayeed 2017). The grounds used for the expulsion of these INGOs was that their re-
registration applications under the 2015 policy had not been approved because they had not 
fulfilled the criteria to re-register their organisations, with all the additional paperwork and 
documentation required. But according to our respondents even those organisations that 
believed that they had filed all the required paperwork received the order to leave. The 
letters of rejection of registration that were received by INGOs from the Interior Ministry 
provided no clear reasons for the rejection – with only general comments about working 
beyond their mandate and in unauthorised areas – and neither did the Ministry provide a list 
of organisations whose registration had been rejected, leaving civil society organisations to 
figure out the number of organisations that had received the letters. Comments by the 
Minister of State for Interior Affairs at this time pointed out that the organisations were doing 
work that was ‘beyond their mandate and for which they have no legal justification’, spent ‘all 
their money’ on administration, were not doing the work they said they were doing, and were 
working in areas where they were not authorised (Sayeed 2017).  
 
To many of our respondents in international organisations, this came as sudden and drastic 
action. INGOs’ foreign registration and connections, and the fact that both these and 
national organisations receive large amounts of international funds leave them open to 
suspicions of ‘working for foreign agendas against Pakistan’s interests’, or even laundering 
foreign funds for actors working in the country. State officials have made statements to 
media that indicate such a mind-set, suggesting that international organisations have been 
targeted for operating in areas where the state has reason to believe that ‘Western 
intelligence agencies’ are active. Another added, ‘basically, the government is trying to 
follow and keep an eye on the money trail, which is quite understandable.’ This rationale 
was confirmed to a respondent from a national organisation by two government ministers. 
Interestingly, the high perceived salaries of INGO staff seemed to be one reason why some 
officials suspected that INGOs were fronting intelligence activities funded by foreign state 
agencies (Stacey and Bokhari 2017). One respondent explained, ‘the obscure thinking that 
foreign money comes with some covert agenda has made its way to the minds of policy 
makers’. To many respondents, this explanation answers the puzzle of why there are no 
discernible patterns in the actions taken against INGOs, or why clearer reasons have not 
been provided for the rejection of their registration applications – ‘the decisions have been 
taken merely based on security perspective’ suggested a respondent. ‘Whenever security 
mind-set takes over, there’s always a compromise on democratic values and voices,’ said 
another.  
 
At the time of our interviews in March 2018, many organisations had appealed the decision, 
but there was still a lack of clarity on the final list of organisations whose appeals had been 
accepted or rejected. The work of most organisations had continued uninterrupted in the 
meantime on the basis of letters of interim permission until applications and appeals were 
decided one way or another. However, the uncertainty and the arduous appeals process, 
which include hearings of review requests at the Interior Ministry, has distracted from some 
activities. One respondent explained the review process as follows:  
 
We were offered a chance to challenge the decision and contest the case, which we 
did. They did not ask a lot of questions and certainly did not issue any explanation of 
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why the decision was taken against us. After a brief hearing, the bench stated that we 
would be informed of the decision in due time. So in a nutshell, we do not know what it 
is that has earned us the ire of the government so much so that we’ve been denied the 
permission to work in Pakistan, we have no idea how long it would take to conclude 
the hearing process and meanwhile, our organisation has continued to suffer like all 
the other organisations that have not been offered MoUs. 
 
4.3 Impacts on civil society actors and activities 
Through 2016 and 2017 the state’s attempts at regulation and restriction had been targeted 
at local organisations working on women’s and human rights, but towards the end of 2017 
this focus was widened to include a long list of international organisations headquartered in 
different countries around the world, including the US, Europe and Australia, and working 
across a number of areas including service delivery. This surprised people in both national 
and international organisations, both because service delivery sectors had until recently 
found support from the Pakistani state, and because it included organisations such as Open 
Society Foundation (OSF) and Plan International that had had positive working relationships 
with the government in the past. 
 
Between October and November 2017, medical facilities run by Médecins Sans Frontières 
(MSF) in the tribal areas were closed down when they were refused a NOC despite the fact 
that the organisation had been operating in the area for over a decade through about 120 
local staff (given restrictions on the movement of international staff in tribal areas), spent 
more than $27 million in Pakistan in 2016, and there were few alternate medical facilities in 
the areas that local residents could access (Toppa 2018). The organisation now has no 
presence in the severely under-provided tribal area. According to its country representative, 
 
Healthcare services are very limited in the area and most of our patients cannot afford 
to pay for even basic medical care. As the only major hospital providing free, quality 
healthcare in the area, the closure of MSF’s activities will leave a major gap and have 
serious negative implications for the health of people living in Bajaur6 and the 
surrounding areas, such as Mohmand Agency.7  
 
The refusal of a NOC came after MSF had significantly increased its coverage under a real 
demand for its services. In a statement, the organisation pointed out that, 
 
In the first nine months of 2017, MSF teams provided care to 41,029 patients in the 
hospital, compared to 38,865 in all of 2016. More than 14,400 patients were seen in 
the stabilisation room between January and September 2017, compared to around 
8,200 in the whole of 2016. In addition, 1,152 deliveries were assisted by skilled MSF 
medical staff between January and September 2017, compared to 1,291 in all of 
2016.8 
 
Service delivery by other INGOs is similarly extensive, especially to marginalised 
populations. Annexe 1 provides these details for the INGOs that were asked to leave, but as 
examples: 
 
 Plan International’s website suggests that it has worked with over 1.6 million children 
across 4,945 communities in Pakistan since 1997 (Plan International n.d.) 
 Trocaire has 150,000 direct beneficiaries and 1.3 million indirect beneficiaries annually  
 World Vision has direct and indirect beneficiary group of 794,852 children and youth 
that receive ‘access to education, protection, sustainable income generation, health 
                                                     
6  One of seven agencies (divisions) of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). 
7  www.msf.org/en/article/pakistan-closure-msf-project-northwest-will-leave-thousands-without-healthcare 
8  ibid. 
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care, food and better care within their homes and communities’ (World Vision Pakistan 
n.d.) 
 Marie Stopes Society claims to have helped the state save about PKR 26 billion in 
direct healthcare costs, served 51.1m family planning clients, averted 4.5m unwanted 
pregnancies, and saved 5,655 mothers from mortality (Marie Stopes Pakistan 2016, 
2013) 
 
INGOs point out that they work extensively with local partners in remote parts of the country, 
generating employment and capacitating local organisations by providing them with facilities 
and building necessary skills. Members of these organisations have claimed, both in 
speaking with the media and in interviews with us, that their closure will result in the end of 
life-saving assistance to thousands of people affected by violence, disasters, and a general 
lack of good quality service provision, claims that are supported by the numbers provided on 
their websites and in their reports.  
 
Eleven of the organisations that received the notification of closure from the Interior Ministry 
are part of the Pakistan Humanitarian Forum (PHF). PHF’s calculations indicate that about 
$124 million in committed funding for 2018 will be lost if these 11 organisations shut down. 
Simple extrapolations from this figure put the annual loss for all listed organisations at 
upwards of $350 million.9 These are large-scale activities that reach, directly and indirectly, 
many millions of the most marginalised and impoverished Pakistanis. Some figures help 
make the point. Between them, the 11 organisations, 
 
 Served about 8.7 million people throughout Pakistan  
 Employed 800 Pakistani staff directly, and about 6000 through partners 
 Delivered US$11.5 million worth of successfully implemented humanitarian relief and 
development projects reaching over 450,000 people in Khyber-Pakhtunkwha, FATA 
and Punjab in the second quarter of 2017 alone.10  
 
Other estimates given by the media, of the wider impacts of the closures, have suggested 
the overall figure of affected beneficiaries could stand at 29 million nationally, 14 per cent of 
the population (DAWN 2017). Foreign-aid groups were also noted to have contributed over 
$285 million for development and emergency relief in 2016. 
 
These figures provide indications of the magnitude and severity of the potential loss of 
services from the closure of INGOs. Hard figures for the expected impact of closure are 
difficult to access, especially within a general atmosphere of uncertainly and fear within 
which the organisations are currently operating. Organisational finances and expenditure 
have become sensitive issues because the government has targeted these as part of their 
criticism (specifically the allegation that INGOs may be spending more on staff salaries than 
on projects), and information on future planning is considered commercially sensitive by 
some, because INGOs are worried that knowledge of the extent of their troubles with the 
state may negatively impact projects in the pipeline on which decisions have not yet been 
finalised by their funders. A member of one organisation explained how the current situation 
of uncertainly meant that they risked losing about $5 million in funding during the appeals 
process alone, because of the lack of clarity around their future registration status. Another 
reported that since their status became unclear in 2015 they had lost around $180 million in 
funding, shrunk their programmes, losing 190 of their 230 staff between 2015 and 2018, and 
failing to reach 3 million children that were previously direct beneficiaries. 
 
                                                     
9  Author’s calculations based on Annexe 1 (and counting the German foundations as three separate organisations). 
10  Pakistan Humanitarian Forum Factsheet: PHF Project NOCs Q2 April – June 2017. The information is based on 19 
organisations that submitted 50 Project NOCs during this period. 
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The commercial sensitivity of these restrictions relates to the need for donor partners to 
have formal registration status, even though they know why this remains elusive for most 
INGOs at the moment. Most donors are reluctant to work with organisations that have not 
been offered MoUs, and so INGOs are currently unable to compete for projects and calls, 
which has adversely affected their financial situation. In some cases, support has been 
withdrawn even for projects that had already been approved before INGOs applications for 
registration were refused by the government. One respondent pointed out that, ‘even if we 
are offered a MoU as a result of our review application, we would have lost huge projects 
and would be left with no operational budgets to continue working in Pakistan’. Another 
noted that during the past two years, their projects amounted to only about $8 million, and 
that this was a fraction of before 2016, and that they had lost $9 million in new funding for a 
project on primary education for over 1 million girls in remote parts of the country because 
they were not formally registered with the government. 
 
Annexe 1 provides more details for a concrete idea of the types of beneficiary groups be 
impacted by the expulsion of these INGOs. Given the current state of uncertainty and 
vagueness around both the expulsion orders and the process of appeals, the table is based 
on the most widely circulated categorisation of organisations as of March 2018. We were 
able to adjust the list based on information received from some of our respondents. The 
material covers organisations whose applications for re-registration were not approved after 
they applied under the 2015 policy, those whose re-registration is still being considered, and 
those whose status has been changed from an INGO to an IPO – a term that had not been 
clarified by the state, but which most respondents believe refers to ‘International Political 
Organisations’, since it grouped together organisations connected to political parties in the 
US and in Germany.11  
 
The affected organisations work across multiple sectors, including health and reproductive 
rights; education; water and sanitation; livelihoods; bonded labour; child and women’s rights; 
and peace-building. A detailed scan of their activities in Columns E, F and G in Annexe 1 
indicate that the greatest impact may be grouped around SDGs 3 (good health and well-
being), 4 (quality education), 5 (gender equality), 6 (clean water and sanitation), 8 (decent 
work and economic growth), 11 (sustainable cities and communities), and 16 (peace, justice, 
strong institutions). Of these, by far the issue areas that feature most prominently are 
education and health (indicated for 17 and 19 organisations respectively, out of the 29 listed 
in Annexe 1). This is paradoxical, because both of these sectors represent major priorities of 
the national and provincial governments, are areas in which public-private partnerships have 
been pursued in the past, and are considered areas most acceptable for both national and 
international NGOs to work in.  
 
Equally paradoxical is the fact that in the interviews conducted by the Interior Ministry with 
each individual organisation in the on-going process of appeals, organisations have been 
explicitly asked about their contribution to specific SDGs12 and whether they are willing to 
change to other areas of work. ‘The right answer,’ said one respondent, ‘is yes’. The state 
has not specified which areas it may want INGOs to shift to, but many of our respondents 
continued to believe that that the government’s preferred areas of engagement for INGOs 
were health and education, and that it was work on thematic areas such as gender-based 
violence, minority rights, human rights, water distribution, and peace building that was being 
specifically discouraged. However, as one of our respondents was quick to point out, 
 
                                                     
11  The fact that the International Rescue Committee (IRC) is included as an IPO is believed to be a mistake, possibly the 
result of officials having confused the IRC with the International Republican Institute (IRI), an organisation associated 
with the Republican Party in the US, and which is included in the list of INGOs whose cases were not approved. 
12  This was confirmed by all our respondents that had been through these interviews. 
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All these statements are based on hints received by different organisations and their 
perception of the situation. There is no documented proof for any of these trends. In 
fact, if we look at all the different organisations that have been denied the permission 
to work in the country, we cannot see a geographical, thematic, political or any other 
trend which we can use to see why and who has been issued letters of acceptance 
and who has not been accepted. 
 
4.4 Wider impacts on civic space 
The closure of INGOs in Pakistan has a number of implications, both developmental and 
political. In terms of developmental impact, the most immediate and obvious is that millions 
of direct and indirect beneficiaries of INGO projects are already not receiving essential 
services, and many more will be left without these if and when they exit the country. This 
effect may be particularly harmful given that there are no obvious indications that the 
government has a clear plan to fill the gap that will be left by these departing organisations, 
so that communities previously served by these INGOs and their local partners may be left 
without any support or services. 
 
Another obvious impact is in terms of the funds that flow into the country and into the 
provision of essential services through these INGOs. Besides the communities that they 
serve, the withdrawal of these funds is also expected to have an impact on the many local 
CSOs that partner with the INGOs in implementing community projects. These local 
organisations may see a curtailing of their own financial sustainability, as well as their ability 
to employ local staff. The local employment market in the development sector may shrink 
significantly, as over 6000 local staff’s work and salaries will be affected. Some respondents 
think this may actually have a positive impact by rationalising salaries in the sector, and 
allowing local organisations access to quality staff that are usually snapped up by INGOs, 
based on the very high salaries offered by this sector. However, there is a genuine concern 
that the local sector may not have enough immediate absorptive capacity, and thousands of 
livelihoods will be either directly affected, or indirectly through ripple effects within the 
development sector.  
 
Interestingly, respondents suggested that civil society’s absorptive capacity has been 
weakened over time, not just in Pakistan but in other countries too, by the fact that donors 
are regularly granting large contracts to the UN and private sector companies (what donors 
perceive as ‘best placed actors’) instead of to international and national NGOs, especially 
small, local ones. This reduces the capacity of local organisations and also makes 
development work conform to the ideas and values of for-profit private enterprises, rather 
than locally embedded organisations with decades of practical knowledge and experience of 
humanitarian work. Donors can help recreate a working environment in which national 
NGOs can hope to compete on the basis of equal opportunity, thus supporting the 
development of local expertise and capacity, and local solutions to development problems. 
‘This would deal with the major objection that donors pay big bucks to expats to fix local 
problems’, said one respondent. Many CSOs work from project to project, meeting 
immediate targets set by others, rather than building their capacity through longer-term 
strategic planning and systems, databases and knowledge acquisition, and the ability to 
retain experienced staff. 
 
In terms of political implications, Pakistan’s international standing may be affected. The 
sudden closure of key development organisations may affect the government’s ability to 
meet targets on various developmental commitments, such as the SDGs, Pakistan’s own 
Vision 2025, the donor-led Grand Bargain, and the European Union’s trade-led Generalised 
System of Preferences+, along with various United Nations treaties and conventions. 
Continued restrictions on humanitarian and civil society space could undermine Pakistan’s 
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international reputation as a democratic and accountable government, as well as one that is 
able to provide vulnerable communities with access to lifesaving and life enhancing services. 
 
There is now a new government in place after the July 2018 elections, led by the Pakistan 
Tehreek-i-Insaaf (PTI). In the months leading up to the election our respondents had already 
started to hope that the government may eventually come to realise the real developmental 
impact of restricting civil space in this way, but ‘the question remains, is this a fight that a 
weak government is willing to pick against the army?’ wondered one respondent, referring to 
the undue influence of the military in the securitisation of Pakistan’s development policy. 
 
I’m afraid this isn’t an important enough issue on which a beleaguered government will 
take on an increasingly insecure security establishment, especially since their interests 
converge broadly on this issue. I think the INGO situation will eventually work itself out, 
but not that for local NGOs that are far more affected but also far more powerless 
because no party is championing their cause.  
 
 
5  Conclusions and implications 
5.1 The implications of changing civic space for development in Pakistan 
The propositions in the conceptual framework of this study suggested how changes in civic 
space were likely to impact on inclusive development under different political settlements 
and conditions of ‘fit’ between civil society and the state. These suggested that in a formally 
democratic, competitive but predatory state such as Pakistan, we can expect to see 
attempts to de-legitimise civil society on grounds that it is unrepresentative, elitist, or foreign, 
and to demonstrate the state’s power over NGOs and CSOs through heavy-handed 
restrictions that limit their resources or scope of work. Predatory states often rely 
substantially on foreign-funded NGOs or CSOs to deliver services, in particular the 
emergency and humanitarian services that are associated with many such developing 
countries, but without a significant watchdog role for civil society. The likely impact of such 
restrictions on civil society will primarily affect the most vulnerable and marginalised groups, 
who are likely to suffer most through a lack of voice and political pressure on political elites; 
there are likely to be no major protest movements or possibility of moving against elite 
interests; and instead of which people would be more likely to exit where possible, and/or 
engage in extremist politics and violent resistance. 
 
This is visible in the case of increased restrictions on NGOs in Pakistan, and in particular the 
threatened closure of INGOs. Civil society actors have been forced to stop, curb, or change 
their activities in order to align not with the state’s developmental agenda, but rather with its 
security agenda, without a clear alternative plan in place to offset the effects of such action 
on the most marginalised groups. A political settlement that is configured around the military, 
a securitised state, and economic elites that make up its political parties means that civil 
society actors do not play a significant watchdog role in Pakistan and are not able to 
contribute to holding the state accountable. At the same time, it also means that even if the 
needs of marginalised populations are not being served, there are no major protest 
movements organised around these interests (barring an emergent ethnic movement of 
Pukhtoons that is still in its very early days), given an environment of exclusion, fear, and 
insecurity. This atmosphere also means that civil society groups of all varieties – including 
media and academia – can be expected to develop strategies for adapting to, or working 
around imposed restrictions, where possible, rather than resorting to resistance or protest. 
 
The present case study explored the ways in which new and proposed restrictions on NGOs 
in Pakistan are likely to shape the nature, scale and form of services received by 
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marginalised groups, and in particular to assess the extent to which such impacts are likely 
to be measurable in any robust and quantitative sense. We used a single detailed case to 
make visible and extrapolate findings about the development impact of closing civic space 
more broadly in Pakistan. While some figures of the expected impacts were available in 
Pakistan, it was difficult to assess the likely impacts in a robust way, partly because of a 
general atmosphere of uncertainly and fear, but also because such figures are not regularly 
collected. As pointed out in the conceptual framework, ‘the mechanisms through which civic 
space impacts development outcomes can be complex, contradictory, matter at different 
points in time, and work at different levels and parts of economic, social and political 
systems’. To help unravel these mechanisms for the purpose of investigation, more robust 
data is required. This includes: 
 
 Organisational life histories that can highlight the particular paths that organisations 
take to adapt to closing space and the ways in which this affects their work. We 
suggested above that despite the heavy-handedness of the Pakistani state, the current 
episode of contention is possibly aimed more at the regulation of NGOs rather than 
their complete expulsion from the country, and that we expect these organisations to 
find ways to adapt to these pressures. Much more research is required to understand 
the exact ways in which organisations do this, and the impact of these strategies on 
their activities, project outputs, and developmental outcomes.  
 Data and evidence on the contribution of civil society to development outcomes in 
Pakistan. Such evidence is very sparse at present, and many respondents 
acknowledged the need to have better indicators of contributions across the sector to 
challenge the global shrinkage of civic space. A major reason for this scarcity (in 
addition to the sensitive nature of the data) is that data collection is costly and usually 
not included in civil society organisations’ list of deliverables. Donors can help the 
situation by encouraging CSOs to maintain regular and collective data on the 
magnitude of their work, and its actual impact on particular development outcomes, 
possibly even connected up to databases that publicly track CSOs’ contributions to 
progress towards Pakistan’s SDG targets. The impact of closing civic space then 
becomes the flipside of this database, showing how and when work is restricted and 
development outcomes affected.  
 
A shrinking civic space in Pakistan in general, and the increasingly difficult environment for 
INGOs in particular, was explained by our respondents as being the result of a right-wing 
government with an anti-civil society history, a security mind-set nurtured by the army, and 
lessons from a neighbouring superpower (China) that is trying similar strategies at home. 
Yet most respondents believed there was a good chance that INGOs would not actually 
need to leave, and that the entire incident will settle down once the government has figured 
out how to regulate the sector. For some this might mean greater disclosure; for others, a 
reorientation of activities. For many it is good news that they will continue to operate in the 
country, especially around vital needs like education and health. For others, it means that 
work around thematic areas like women’s and minorities’ rights and with the most vulnerable 
communities may be severely curtailed. The situation needs to be monitored by civil society 
actors and by donors because it is likely that disempowered and marginalised groups will be 
excluded from vital services as the state restricts the work of those that amplify their voice 
and build their capacity to engage with the state. This would violate a key principle of the 
SDGs, which is to ‘leave no one behind’. 
 
5.2 Measuring the implications of civic space for development 
This case study was designed to test propositions set out in the conceptual framework, as 
relevant to the countries’ respective political settlements and state-civil society relations, and 
explore the methodological prospects, including data sources, for investigating the 
relationships between changes in civic space and development outcomes. 
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The case studies (this Pakistan case is part of a set) were rapid activities, involving 
experienced researchers in a short country visit, interviews with key informants, and 
secondary data collection and literature review. To optimise resources and sharpen 
analytical focus, the study focused on specific episodes when civic space had been in 
contention in areas likely to impact on development; it then analysed the development 
impacts in line with an understanding of the ‘fit’ between civil society and the state, derived 
from debates about the politics of pro-poor or inclusive development in Pakistan. The 
research was politically sensitive, and required great caution and trust.   
 
In Pakistan, at the time of the fieldwork, the closures were threatened and not yet real. NGO 
activities had slowed or stalled during the period of the study in early 2018, but they had not 
been closed. As of December 2018, 18 of the NGOs had been forced to close.13 The 
analysis traced the potential impacts in terms of the likely losses of programmes, and the 
groups and issues likely to be affected should the closures go through. Although many other 
kinds of NGOs and organisations are also affected by regulations and arbitrary orders, the 
episodes examined here involved mostly international NGOs. INGOs tend to have 
comparatively strong data and monitoring systems, and most were able to provide 
information about the nature and scope of their activities at threat from the proposed 
closures, as well as quantitative assessments of the likely numbers of direct service 
beneficiaries at risk.  
 
One limitation of such direct measures, even with comparatively robust data systems, is that 
NGO officials may themselves have a grasp of only some of the potential impacts of 
closures of their programmes. Individual services may have a number of unintended or 
multiplier development impacts not assumed by the theory of change with which a particular 
NGO is working. As is well known, the provision of education or microfinance may not only 
equip people with literacy or credit, but also empower them to engage with public officials or 
operate in the modern world. Nevertheless, the scale of the likely development impacts, and 
the marginalised groups on whom they were most likely to fall, emerged clearly: in one 
example, a US$27 million health programme was to close, threatening access to health 
services in a remote area which lacked other facilities, and in which the NGO had served 
over 40,000 patients in 2017.  
 
While some figures of expected impacts were available in Pakistan, it was difficult to assess 
these in a robust way, partly because of, as respondents described it, a ‘general atmosphere 
of uncertainty and fear within which the organisations are currently operating’ and because 
‘[o]rganisational finances and expenditure have become sensitive issues both because the 
government has targeted these as part of their criticism (specifically the allegation that 
INGOs [international NGOs] may be spending more on staff salaries than on projects), and 
because INGOs are worried about how their current situation may be perceived by donors 
for ongoing or future projects.’ It seems likely, in addition, that donors and INGOs would 
develop strategies for adapting to, or working around these restrictions, where possible, and 
that service cuts would not be as swingeing as the wholesale closure of the NGOs 
suggested.  
 
Several important likely sources of impact were not measured. Civil society actors adapted 
their activities and/or mutated into different kinds of actors or organisations altogether; to 
analyse this resilience would require organisational life histories to track the trajectories of 
individual civic actors across key moments of change.14 Many NGOs and CSOs are adept at 
managing threats from governments and responding in ways that enable them to keep to 
their mandate without crossing official lines, so that the assessments generated by these 
                                                     
13  http://newsweekpakistan.com/international-ngos-shutter-operations-amid-pakistan-crackdown/. 
14  See, for instance, Lewis (2008). 
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case studies may be overly negative about the measurable effects on development 
outcomes, or overstate the magnitude of the loss of services provided or received. Other 
unmeasured costs of coping with closing space included a high degree of stress and 
personal and organisational costs in coping with or adapting to restricted civic space. The 
actual risks of violence against civic actors, particularly in relation to land, resource, 
indigenous, women’s and LGBTQI rights defenders, are documented by human rights 
monitors, but the costs of civic activism in such contexts are not.  
 
Coping and adapting to narrower civic space is likely to impact adversely on the quality, 
efficiency, and possibly also the transparency and accountability of aid financing to civil 
society. In addition, the costs of shifting activities from mobilisation or empowerment and 
advocacy to service-delivery are likely to be significant in terms of the accountability of 
government policy and the inclusiveness of development. A more robust measure of the 
broader developmental impacts of closing civic space in Pakistan could be generated 
through comparative analysis of periods of relative civic space using mixed methods to 
assess the relationship to the inclusiveness of development in particular periods. Cross-
country comparative analysis would similarly highlight the contributions – or not – of civil 
society to important development functions such as building trust in economic institutions; 
holding powerful actors to account; empowering disadvantaged and marginalised groups; 
protecting the vulnerable; and monitoring development progress.  
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Annexe 1 
Types of services likely to be lost due to NGO closures (based on information 
available in online sources) 
Gender equality and women’s empowerment 
Working towards gender equality and women’s empowerment in Pakistan has been a key 
focus of at least 7 of the 31 CSOs targeted by the Interior Ministry. The closure of these 
NGOs will have a detrimental impact on awareness-raising and advocacy, and will affect 
women’s access to services across a range of issues including their right to land and 
inheritance, gender-based violence (GBV), child marriage, economic empowerment, and 
food security and livelihoods.  
 
Gender-based violence is a key focus of CSOs engaged in gender-related work in Pakistan. 
Trocaire, Rutgers WPF, ActionAid, and the International Catholic Migration Commission 
have been leaders in this area. Between June 2014 and May 2018, Trocaire’s Country 
Strategic Plan on gender-based violence directly covers 17,233 people (7,953 men, 9,280 
women), and further has 237,980 indirect participants. Rutgers WPF has involved nearly 
5,500 men and boys in discussions, dialogues, and interventions to reduce GBV. The 
International Catholic Migration Commission has a GBV programme for refugees and other 
victims of GBV, and has reached 858 Afghan and other refugees. ActionAid’s Country 
Strategy Plan (2013–17) also explicitly aims to promote responsive policies for GBV and 
child marriage.    
 
ActionAid and Save the Children work to secure the economic empowerment of women in 
Pakistan. ActionAid’s Country Strategy Plan (2013–17) aimed to achieve economic 
independence for 150,405 women and the right to land and inheritance for 111,576 women. 
Save the Children focuses its efforts on ensuring economic empowerment through its food 
security and livelihoods assistance work targeted towards women and youth in cotton-
growing communities.  
 
International Alert has been involved in awareness-raising regarding gender relations, and in 
2014, helped to start more than 10,000 study circles that have resulted in shifts in people’s 
attitudes, perceptions and behaviour around gender relations as well as their understanding 
of the legal, social and economic issues faced by women in particular. ‘Champions’ have 
then spread these messages in their local communities, resulting in people stopping and 
boycotting practices such as early and forced marriage. The Asia Foundation, in partnership 
with the Aurat Foundation, has implemented the Gender Equity programme to increase 
gender equity in Pakistan. 
 
Health 
At least 8 of the 30-odd CSOs targeted by the Interior Ministry have been working towards 
improving health outcomes in Pakistan. The closure of these NGOs will have an immediate 
impact on essential service delivery across a range of health facilities including reproductive 
health, maternal and early childhood health, nutrition, immunisation, mental health, and the 
prevention and treatment of several diseases. 
 
Pathfinder, Marie Stopes, BRAC, Rutgers WPF, and Save the Children have been involved 
in the provision of services related to reproductive health and family planning. From 2010–16, 
Marie Stopes alone served 51.1m family planning clients and averted 4.5m unwanted 
pregnancies. Pathfinder has contributed to advocacy for contraception and has trained 
thousands of community health workers and religious leaders. 
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Marie Stopes, Interactive Research & Development, Mercy Corps, and Save the Children 
have been directly involved in service delivery related to maternal and newborn health.  
For example, Marie Stopes has saved 5,666 mothers from mortality (between 2010 and 
2016) and Mercy Corps has trained health workers and midwives to improve maternal 
childbirth and newborn health.   
 
Between January and September 2017, BRAC has referred 858 children for immunisation, 
and Interactive Research & Development is also involved in immunisation activities.  
Mercy Corps has worked to increase access to Tuberculosis treatment, and Interactive 
Research & Development has provided services related to Tuberculosis, Diabetes, smoking 
cessation and lung health, as well as mental health. Save the Children’s programme on 
Malaria plans to reduce the burden of Malaria by 75 per cent in 38 highly endemic districts of 
Pakistan. Save the Children’s HIV & AIDS initiative also aims to improve access to care and 
support for HIV-affected persons. 
 
Education 
At least 9 of the 30-odd CSOs targeted by the Interior Ministry have been working to improve 
education, literacy, and vocational training on a massive scale in Pakistan. The closure of 
these organisations will have a direct impact on education at various levels, including 
programming, infrastructure and facilities, teacher training, student learning, and the 
management and governance of schools and the education system. 
 
ActionAid, through its Country Strategy Plan (2013–17) aims to provide free and quality 
public education for 379,362 children in Pakistan. In terms of infrastructure and facilities, 
Plan International has reached out to over 10,080 children with its school improvement and 
rehabilitation projects supporting the construction of classrooms and the provision of IT labs. 
Since 2005, Catholic Relief Services has built 114 school structures, trained and mentored 
520 teachers, and conducted hygiene training for 6,688 students in rural communities. 
BRAC, between January and September 2017, has been operating 1,454 primary schools, 
enrolled 43,495 children (64 per cent girls), trained 1,347 teachers in Sindh, and graduated 
5,493 leaners.  
 
The Asia Foundation’s Books for Asia programme has provided Pakistani organisations with 
up to 90,000 books each year. Other CSOs have focussed on student learning – for 
example, Rutgers WPF’s flagship curriculums on Life Skills Based Education (LSBE) have 
provided thousands of students with SRHR education and have trained 402 teachers from 
public and private schools. The International Rescue Committee has committed to ensuring 
age-appropriate reading, writing, and social skills for children as a cornerstone of its work 
between 2015 and 2020. Plan International’s projects on technical and vocational training 
(TVET) have worked to foster youth empowerment, supported 15 public and private sector 
TVET institutions, and have provided 10,000 youth with skills training linkages to 40 local 
employers. Save the Children has been working with the government at district and 
provincial levels to improve management and governance of the education sector.  
 
Children/youth 
Four of the CSOs targeted are focussed on promoting child rights and the social and 
economic development of Pakistan’s youth. World Vision has worked with the country’s 
young population at a massive scale, with 794,852 children and youth targeted directly and 
indirectly to provide them with access to education, protection, sustainable income 
generation, health care, food and better care within their homes and communities. Right to 
Play has focused on positive child development in both the formal school setting and the 
community at large, and has reached 213,407 children with 49 per cent female participation 
as of 2014. Oxfam Novib Pakistan’s My Rights, My Voice (MRMV) programme engages 
marginalised children and major media outlets to increase awareness of youth’s right to SRH 
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and ensure meaningful youth participation. Meanwhile, Save the Children has been working 
on promoting child rights governance by providing technical and financial support to the 
revitalisation of the country's national Child Rights Movement (CRM) (comprising 108 child-
focused NGOs across all four provinces of the country, including Azad Jammu and 
Kashmir). 
 
Humanitarian response/resilience 
CSOs in Pakistan have played a major role in providing humanitarian services to vulnerable 
and disaster-affected populations. At least 9 of the 31 CSOs ordered to leave the country 
have been working extensively in this area, and their activities range from relief, response, 
and recovery assistance to building community resilience systems in various parts of the 
country. 
 
Save the Children has been at the forefront of the humanitarian response to every major 
emergency in Pakistan in recent decades. The CSO was involved in the response to the 
earthquake of 2005, conflicts in FATA and KP, and the floods of 2007, 2008, 2010, 2011, 
2012 and 2013. In 2010, Save the Children reached nearly 4 million flood-affected people 
with humanitarian aid, of which 1.8 million were children. This was the largest humanitarian 
response from Save the Children globally. The organisation also raised US$100,509,868 to 
meet the needs of the affected population in food aid, shelter, health, child protection, 
education, livelihood, water and sanitation. Since 2009, food security and livelihoods 
programs have been implemented in disaster-affected areas with a focus on relatively long-
term activities including comprehensive agrarian packages that help families recover and 
promote their livelihoods for at least two years. 
 
ACTED, Catholic Relief Services, and Open Society Foundations have also been active in 
providing humanitarian relief, response, and recovery in Pakistan. ACTED reports a massive 
488,596 total direct beneficiaries (2016), and has provided 8,200,000 vulnerable, disaster-
affected families with assistance to meet their WASH, shelter, food security, agriculture, 
education, and infrastructure needs between 2009 and 2012. Catholic Relief Services has 
supported more than 1 million people across the country and has built more than 50,000 
transitional shelters, distributed more than 40,000 kits, assisted 38,000 households with 
restoring their agricultural livelihoods. Open Society Foundations has delivered $3m in 
emergency relief funding after the 2005 earthquake and $6m after the 2010 monsoon floods. 
Trocaire’s Humanitarian Programme Plan (March 2017 – December 2019) covers 4,750 
people (2,570 men, 2000 women), and the International Rescue Committee’s new 2020 
strategy for Pakistan aims to reach out to more than 1.4 million people and provide 
emergency response within 72 hours through its Country Emergency Team. 
 
ActionAid, Malteser International, and Mercy Corps, on the other hand, have been working 
extensively to build resilience and strengthen communities against disaster. As a part of its 
Country Strategy Plan (CSP), to be achieved between 2013 and 2017, ActionAid aims to 
adopt community resilience systems for 48,924 vulnerable people in 100 communities. 
Malteser International’s work in this area (June 2016 onwards) aims to improve the 
resilience of around 60,000 people vulnerable coastal communities by strengthening local 
healthcare provision, improving water, sanitation, and hygiene structures, and training local 
people in disaster risk-reduction techniques. In collaborating with local authorities, Mercy 
Corps has been working with local authorities to develop long-term disaster prevention 
efforts like reducing soil erosion to mitigate future flooding. 
 
Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) 
Among the CSOs ordered to leave by the Interior Ministry, The Danish Refugee Council 
(DRC), Catholic Relief Services (CRS), and the International Catholic Migration Commission 
have been key actors in providing assistance to refugees and internally displaced persons in 
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Pakistan. In one year of implementation, DRC has assisted approximately of 250,000 
individuals with activities that included legal assistance, legal documentation, awareness on 
voluntary repatriation, vocational training, NFI distribution, hygiene promotion, rehabilitation 
of schools, health centres and sanitation drainages. CRS has been active near the western 
Afghanistan border, providing a basic literacy programme for both Afghan refugee children 
and children from the Pakistani host community. Most recently, the programme served 500 
children (70 per cent girls and 30 per cent boys), preparing them to enter formal education. 
The International Catholic Migration Commission has also worked with Afghan refugees, 
with 500 school children participating in hazard mapping exercises (2014), 600 individuals 
receiving marketable life skills training in 2014, and 4,387 persons benefitting from 
livelihoods support projects in 2015. The CSO’s GBV programme has reached 858 Afghan 
and other refugees, and its water and sanitation project aims to reach approximately 2,700 
Afghan refugee households comprising of 22,250 individuals (5,400 men, 5,800 women and 
11,050 children). 
 
Democracy, governance, and human rights 
Among the CSOs asked to leave the country, at least seven are working directly and 
indirectly on issues of human rights and democracy in Pakistan. These organisations work in 
a combination of research, advocacy, and service-delivery work in order to promote 
improved governance at various levels in the country. The International Republican Institute 
(IRI) has been working in Pakistan since 2002, conducting public opinion research, national 
and provincial level political party strengthening, democratic governance and civic 
participation programs. The National Democratic Institute has also been promoting 
democratic development in Pakistan, having worked for more than 20 years with political 
parties and civic groups to strengthen democratic institutions. The Institute supports 
programs that help political parties become modern and inclusive, and has worked 
extensively with women and young party activists to help them develop party-building skills 
and advocate for greater inclusion at the decision making level. In addition, the Institute has 
conducted election observation missions, trained party polling agents and worked with 
partner organisations on media, communications and advocacy issues. The German 
foundations (Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Heinrich Böll Stiftung, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung) also 
work on issues ranging from accountable and transparent local government to political 
awareness and the rule of law, while the Asia Foundation focuses on human rights, with 
activities including capacity-building to improve cooperation between Pakistani CSOs and 
provincial governments on human rights governance. 
 
Agriculture and food security 
Four of the NGOs expelled by the Interior Ministry have programmes related to agriculture 
and food security. For example, Mercy Corps has worked with dairy farmers to increase their 
incomes by keeping their animals healthy, while Catholic Relief Services has supported 
7,500 drought-stricken households with concentrated feed and food and animal 
management trainings. As a part of its Country Strategy Plan (2013–17) ActionAid aims to 
achieve food security for 111,576 small-holding farmers, 51,914 of which are women, while 
Save the Children’s food security and livelihood projects in cotton-growing communities 
focus on the empowerment of women and youth specifically.  
 
Water and sanitation  
Trocaire’s programme on Water Rights (March 2017 - December 2021) has a coverage 
4,720 people (2,832 men, 1888 women), with further 28,320 indirect participants, while 
Muslim Aid’s Water for Life/Dig a Well programme has two ongoing projects with 100,000 
beneficiaries across Pakistan. Solidar’s WASH project covers 700 households with an 
estimated 4,900 total beneficiaries. 
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Economic empowerment/poverty reduction 
BRAC, Mercy Corps, and Muslim Aid have worked to promote economic empowerment in 
Pakistan, through a range of programs including microloans and skills training.  Between 
January-September 2017, BRAC provided 55,723 clients with US$18.5 million in microloans. 
Since inception, BRAC microfinance programme has served more than 247,500 clients with 
US$147 million. BRAC’s Programme for Poverty Reduction in Baluchistan to promote 
holistic socioeconomic development for 3,671 households. Muslim Aid also has a 
microfinance programme with a 63,335,000 PKR budget, covering 8,793 beneficiaries in 
Rawalpindi and Chakwal. Mercy Corps works on improving economic opportunities available 
to Pakistanis by providing training in key skills and connecting trainees with local 
employment opportunities.  
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